This article examines the economic institution utilized during the eleventh century to facilitate complex trade characterized by asymmetric information and limited legal contract enforceability. The geniza documents are employed to present the "coalition," an economic institution based upon a reputation mechanism utilized by Mediterranean traders to confront the organizational problem associated with the exchange relations between merchants and their overseas agents. The theoretical framework explains many trade-related phenomena, especially why traders utilized specific forms of business association, and indicates the interrelations between social and economic institutions. M editerranean trade contributed much to the economic growth of southern Europe during the Middle Ages.' The spread of this trade depended, to a large extent, upon traders' ability to employ overseas agents or to let business associates function as overseas agents. The employment of overseas agents was vital during the Middle Ages, since goods were sold abroad only after being shipped to their destination.2 Since, absent contractual problems, a merchant can decrease cost by sending goods to an overseas agent rather than traveling with his goods, a large efficiency gain could potentially be achieved by employing overseas agents.3
Maghribi Traders 861 destination.14 Within the ship the goods were not well sheltered and were often damaged in transit. Furthermore, as the captain of the ship was not responsible for packing, loading, and unloading the goods, there was always the possibility that he or the crew would pilfer the goods. 15 Although prices within each trade center were determined competitively, they were subject to large variations. The nature of the communication and transportation technologies and in particular the length of time it took to deliver goods, and the limited capacity of the buyers to ship goods, made supply and demand in each trade center rather rigid. Any demand or supply shock thus led to a sharp change in prices. The price of flax in Sfax (Tunisia) around 1059, for example, fell from 70 to 40 dinars within a short period of time. The price of lead rose from 8 to 14 quarter-dinars following the arrival of 25 ships of buyers in Mazara (Sicily). 16 Because all of the countries between Spain and South Arabia formed a closely knit trading area, changes affecting business in one country were felt abroad. The general principles regulating the fluctuation of prices were well known to eleventh-century merchants, who tried to gather information and to update their business decisions accordingly. When one merchant learned that a large flax crop was expected in Egypt, he advised his business associate in Tunisia to sell all the flax he had as quickly as possible. The latter chose to sail to Sicily with the flax since he had been informed that the prices there were higher. In 1061 the price of wheat in Tunisia rose sharply when it became known that the Normans had conquered Messina (Sicily). 17 The geniza documents utilized for this study relate mainly to a group known as the Maghribi traders. These were Jewish traders who lived in the Abbasid caliphate (centered in Baghdad) until the first half of the tenth century, when they emigrated to North Africa (a part of the Maghrib, the Muslim world's West), mainly to Tunisia. This region was prospering at that time under the rule of the Fatimid caliphate. Later, during the eleventh century, one finds Maghribi traders who emigrated 14 Ibid., pp. 273 ff.; termination in Libya instead of Sicily: TS 20.152, a, 11. 24-25, Gil, Palestine, vol. 2, p. 727. 15 
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Greif from Tunisia to Spain, Sicily, Egypt, and Palestine. Some of them went as far as Byzantium and eastern Europe.18 The Maghribi traders were largely middle class. Although some of them invested in merchandise worth at least several thousands dinarsa considerable sum for a period in which middle-class household expenditures per month averaged less than three dinars-most were involved in business ventures worth no more than a few hundred dinars. The number of traders who operated during the eleventh century is not known; the several dozens of traders mentioned in the geniza clearly represent only a partial listing. 19 Although the Maghribi immigrants integrated into existing Jewish communities, they also retained a strong sense of identity and solidarity among themselves.20 In their letters they refer to themselves as "our people, the Maghribis, the travelers [traders]" or "our people." 21 The distinct identity of the Maghribi traders within the Jewish communities is also suggested by letters written by Jews other than the Maghribi traders. In 1030 a letter from Fustat to the head of the yeshiva in Jerusalem happily reports that some Maghribis have joined the Fustat yeshiva's synagogue. Twenty-four years later, in a report sent to Jerusalem concerning the condition of that synagogue, the "Maghribi people" are still mentioned as a separate group. 22 It is important to note that the Maghribi traders did not establish a separate religious-ethnic community apart from the Jewish community. Nor did they represent a "natural" group, which binds together individuals in all (or at least most) important aspects of their lives.23 The bonds of a natural group usually discourage dishonest conduct. A Maghribi trader, living far away from most the other Maghribi traders and within a large and well-organized Jewish community, could, in fact, become totally integrated into this larger social group and could abandon his special ties with the Maghribi traders.24 Indeed, when a 18 The Maghribi traders coped with the uncertainty and complexity of the trade-they reduced the cost of trade-by operating through business associates, whom they relied upon to handle some of their business dealings abroad.26 The merchants exploited this advantage by allocating risk better through diversification and shifting trade activities across trade centers, goods, and time; by operating as sedentary traders, thus saving opportunity costs and the expense and risk of a journey; and by enjoying the expertise of their business associates.27 Partnerships enabled the traders to diversify their capital while retaining the benefits of economies of scale and scope. Another form of business association, the commenda, regulated relations between a business associate who was ready to bear the risk and the effort of travel but was unable to commit himself to return the capital in case of loss.28 Additional efficiency was achieved by the mere fact that a merchant could rely on someone else to handle his affairs in his absence, an important factor for those merchants who sailed between trade centers.29
The importance of operating through business associates is suggested by the variety of the tasks business associates performed. These included loading and unloading the ship; paying the customs, bribes, and transportation fees; storing the goods; gathering and delivering information; transferring the goods to market; and deciding when, how, and to some degree. Traders did interact over time and shared a common religion and history (see Gil, Palestine, vol. 1, p. 223, and Goitein, Economic Foundations, p. 149). However, the point is that each trader was far away from most of the other traders, had commercial relations with only some of them, and belonged to another social group-the Jewish community. 25 The relations between business associates reflected in the geniza suggest that these relations were based upon mutual trust.32 Many, if not most, of the business associations mentioned in the geniza were conducted without relying upon the legal system. Many business associations were not based upon legal contract. Others, although based upon legal contracts, involved additional instructions through letters and the operation of one party at distance from the other. Nevertheless, only a handful of documents reflect allegations about misconduct.33
To understand why "trust" governed the relations between business associates, one has to address a more general question, namely, what was the institution through which the contractual relations among business associates were organized? The starting point in addressing this question is to identify the common denominator among the forms of business association which contributed directly to cost reduction.
ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION, REPUTATION, "TRUST," AND THE COALITION
Operating through business associates enabled a trader to confront risk and to reduce the cost of trade by entrusting an overseas business associate with his commercial affairs abroad. In other words, the cost reduction resulted from letting a business associate function as an overseas agent for the association, who supplied the services required in handling the capital abroad. An (overseas) agent is someone involved in trade ventures in which the capital or the profit (loss) or both are not exclusively his own but are shared with a merchant (an individual or a partnership) located in a different trade center.34 To clarify the difference between an agent and a business associate, consider the case of a partnership. Usually partners operated in a different trade center; each of them sold the goods that were sent to him, bought some merchandise, 30 If honesty is a problem, a neoclassical market for agents' services fails to provide an institution through which agency relations can be organized. The anonymous, discrete, neoclassical market is one in which "faceless buyers and sellers, households and firms that grind out decision rules from their objective functions (utility, profit) meet . .. for an instant to exchange standardized goods at equilibrium prices."37 In a neoclassical market, once an agent is hired, he maximizes his own profit by exploiting the asymmetric information and reporting total loss. In an anonymous market, conduct in a given period has no effect upon the reward in subsequent periods. The agent thus has nothing to lose by cheating the merchant. Aware this is how an agent will act, however, no merchant would ever hire one to begin with.
In the eleventh century the legal system failed to provide a framework within which agency relations could be organized. The court was relations can be distinguished." The first enables an agent to signal that he is trustworthy because he fears God, or has internalized an ideology of honesty. The second mechanism enables an agent to establish ex ante that his most profitable course ex post is to be honest. This mechanism allows an agent credibly to commit himself ex ante to be honest ex post. The merchant can thus trust the agent-the agent possesses a reputation as honest agent. The geniza reflects the importance of the second mechanism, where an agent remains honest out of desire to retain his position as an agent. To make this position attractive, the merchant must create a gap between the expected lifetime utility of an agent employed by him and the agent's best alternative elsewhere. To do so the merchant has to provide the agent a premium; for example, he can pay him a wage premium.45 Of equal importance is the implicit contract established between merchant and agent, under which the merchant threatens to fire the agent and never operate through him again if he discovers that the agent has ever cheated.46 Given a premium and the implicit contract, a dishonest agent can earn a short-run gain by cheating while an honest agent will earn a long-run gain by being paid a premium. An agent acquires the reputation of an honest agent if it is known that the long-run gain is not less than the short-run gain. The agent can not increase his lifetime utility by cheating. The merchant will offer the agent an optimal premium-the lowest cost premium for which the long-run gain is not less than the short-run gain. 47 The above theory points to an arrangement which can improve upon this simple reputation mechanism.48 Agency relations can be organized within an economic institution that may be referred to as a "coalition." 4S That is, above the wage that the agent can get elsewhere. 46 Note that it is assumed that there is some positive probability that the merchant will be able to detect deviation. See below on the mechanism employed by the Maghribi traders to balance the asymmetric information. 47 For a more detailed discussion of this mechanism, see Greif, "Reputation and Coalitions." 48 An improvement means a reduction in the optimal premium-a reduction that has efficiency, in addition to distributional, implications.
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That is a nonanonymous organizational framework through which agency relations are established only among agents and merchants with a specific identity ("coalition members"). Relations among the coalition members are governed by an implicit contract which states that each coalition merchant will employ only member agents and will pay them the optimal premium.49 Moreover, all coalition merchants agree never to employ an agent who cheated while operating for a coalition member. Furthermore if an agent who was caught cheating operates as a merchant, coalition agents who cheated in their dealing with him will not be considered by other coalition members to have cheated.
This implicit contract improves upon the simple reputation mechanism. It reduces the optimal premium that a merchant has to pay an agent to keep him honest, all other things being equal.50 In addition, the implicit contract enables merchants to employ agents for assignments which both parties know ahead of time will be of short duration. Since an agent who considers cheating a specific merchant risks his relations with all the coalition members, the agent's lifetime expected utility is rather robust with respect to the length of his associations with a specific merchant. Hence the optimal premium is independent of the ex ante known length of his relations with a specific merchant.
While theoretical considerations can generate many hypotheses, one has to look at the evidence to verify any postulate. In the next section direct and indirect evidence that supports the claim that agency relations were organized within a coalition is presented. Furthermore, the evidence enriches our understanding of the coalition's nature.
THE EVIDENCE Direct Evidence on Various Aspects of the Coalition
The geniza contains direct documentary evidence on various aspects of the coalition, such as the operation of the implicit contract, the economic nature of the punishment inflicted on cheaters, the linkage between past conduct and future economic reward, the interest that all coalition members took in the relations between a specific agent and merchant, and so forth.
Evidence of the implicit contract within the coalition is found in two letters dated 1055. According to the letters, an agent who lived in Jerusalem, Abun ben Zedaka, was accused (although not charged in court) of embezzling the money of a Maghribi trader. When word of this accusation reached other Maghribi traders, merchants as far away as 4' The coalition, however, is not a monopsony in the usual sense of the term since, as described below, a Maghribi trader usually operated as a merchant and an agent at the same time.
so Since it reduces the probability that a cheater will be able to receive the premium somewhere else. The theoretical framework can be utilized to provide an explanation for the above phenomena. The implicit contract within the coalition creates a capital premium; it increases the returns on a member merchant's capital since it reduces the wage premium that a merchant has to pay his agent to keep him honest. Thus a member merchant will hire as his agent another member merchant. The wage premium that has to be paid to such a merchant-agent is lower than the wage premium that has to be paid to a trader who acts only as an agent since in considering cheating the merchant-agent will take into account the fact that he will also lose the capital premium available to him. In addition, his own member agents will cheat him, and according to the implicit contract within the coalition, they will not be punished.74
This theoretical observation leads to a testable prediction and is a key in explaining the above phenomena. Since the implicit contract within the coalition creates a capital premium, merchants prefer to utilize other merchants as their agents. This preference may be reflected in the choice of forms of business association; agency relations will be organized through forms that requires agents' investment. Indeed, the common denominator of the forms of business association utilized by the Maghribi traders is that both parties invested in trade. In Italy, one may conjecture, agency relations were not organized within a coalition and thus a merchant preferred to employ as his agent an individual whose income from his alternative occupation was the lowest. Thus, merchants utilized agents through commenda relations. 75 Organizing agency relations within the coalition, and the resulting reliance on a capital premium, explains why traders served as both agents and merchants simultaneously and why agency relations were as flexible as they were. More generally, the reliance on capital premium determined the social characterizations of the Maghribi traders group. One does not observe the existence of two separate "classes" among them-an agents class and a merchants class. Socially, as mentioned above, the Maghribi traders group was a homogeneous group of middle-class traders and each of them operated as a merchant and as an agent at the same time.
The theoretical framework clarifies additional phenomena related to agency relations. Among the Maghribi traders, agency relations were clearly not limited to family members or organized within a family firm. The essence of the family firm in twelfth-century Italy was that relatives 74 An agent-merchant may avoid these losses by employing a nonmember agent. This requires a larger premium, however, and implies a reduction in the value of the merchant's capital. 75 The cost of an honest agent is lower, the lower his income from his alternative occupation (his reservation utility). The Italian merchants preferred to hire agents without capital and therefore they could not utilize friendships and partnerships in agency relations. made up a partnership that was not dissolved after one partner's death; parties to the agreement were legally bound to fulfill the other partners' commitments. Among the Maghribi traders, traders' sons usually became traders and some evidence suggests that relatives were considered morally responsible for their relatives' business dealings.76 However, intergenerational relations among the Maghribi traders were not aimed at preserving the family wealth under one roof. A trader's son started to operate as an independent trader during the father's lifetime. The father would typically help the son until he was able to operate independently. After the father's death, his estate was divided among his heirs and his business dissolved.77 Why did the intergenerational relations among the Maghribi traders take this form? Why were family firms not established?
To comprehend these phenomena, note that for merchants and agents alike membership in a coalition was a valuable asset that could be transferred from father to son. The intergenerational transfer was also desirable from the coalition's point of view since it enabled the traders to base their relations upon a reputation mechanism despite the fact that human life is finite and thus a merchant might cheat in his old age. Sons were their fathers' "insurance policy," and relatives were considered morally responsible for their relatives' business dealings. Thus, an old agent would not cheat because he feared that he would be punished through the punishment imposed on his relatives. Only moral responsibility of relatives was required to enable the traders to base their relations upon a reputation mechanism despite the fact that each of them lived for a finite number of years.
The fact that family firms were not established within a coalition is not surprising. To assure truthful reporting and to reduce the cost of an honest agent, a merchant had to signal credibly that he would operate through an agent for many periods.78 In Italy, one may conjecture, this commitment was made by establishing a family firm, whose lifespan was "infinite," and which was less likely to go bankrupt than a single merchant.79 In a coalition this commitment is obtained without the establishment of a family firm. As long as an agent was honest, there 76 78 Thus increasing the likelihood that the honest agent will receive his long-run gains. 79 A family is a natural group and its members are thus honest in their dealings with each other regardless of the organizational form of the family's wealth. That is, agency relations between family members can be conducted when each family member has his own business. My conjecture is that the family aggregated its capital in a family firm to facilitate the establishment of agency relations between the family members and outsiders.
Greif was a high probability that he would be hired by another coalition member after ceasing to operate for a particular merchant.
Among the Maghribi traders, agency relations resembled the relations between a modem firm and its workers in that typically no explicit legal commitment governed the length of the relationship. Where a commitment was made, it was for a short period of time. Commenda and partnership contracts were usually limited to a specific trade venture or season; friendships and factor relations could be terminated at any time by either party. The duration of agency relations ex post varied from a single season to several generations, with sons replacing their fathers.80 Agents appear to have performed honestly even when they knew beforehand that they would not be rehired. If trust relations were based upon ethics or a social control system, one would expect to find long-term contracts (or at least some distribution of contracts' length). Once a trader identified an "honest" agent, he would try to operate through him as long as he could. Long-term contracts would presumably facilitate this aim. On the other hand, if agency relations were based upon a two-party reputation mechanism, how can we explain honest functioning of agency relations which the parties knew would terminate after a short time?
Whenever a reputation mechanism is employed, a merchant prefers short-term contracts. The shorter the contract, the sooner the merchant can punish a cheater, and the less he will have to pay to keep his agent honest.8' The ability to establish agency relations that were known beforehand to be of short duration is clear once one realizes that the Maghribi traders organized agency relations within a coalition.
Similar reasoning can be utilized to address another issue. The Maghribi traders used a "per-trade-venture" (rather than "per-agent" or "multi-trade-venture") accounting system, in which the income and expenses associated with each trade venture were detailed.82 What is the rationale (if any) behind the "per-venture" accounting method?
A "per-venture" accounting system is more efficient than a multiventure accounting system whenever a reputation mechanism is employed. Calculating the gain and loss after each transaction enables 80 Why is such association not observed? These phenomena are explained by utilizing the theoretical framework to address the determinants of the coalition's size. The coalition's boundaries are determined by the information-transmission mechanism that provides information about agents' past conduct. Once a mechanism for information transmission through mutual acquaintances is established, the coalition that utilizes this mechanism will not expand. Agency relations will be held only among individuals with respect to whom information is available. Given the implicit contract within the coalition, a nonmember merchant will never hire a coalition member agent (that is, an agent about whom information is available only to members). The premium he has to pay to a member agent to keep him honest is higher than the premium he has to pay to a nonmember. The difference in the required premium results from the fact that a member agent has an option not available to a nonmember agent, namely, to be employed within the coalition after he cheated a nonmember merchant. This increases the short-run gains of a member agent from cheating a nonmember merchant. To offset this increase, a nonmember merchant has to pay a higher premium to a member agent than to a nonmember. Given that a nonmember will not hire a member agent, and given the implicit contract within the coalition, the premium that a member merchant has to pay a member agent is less than the premium he has to pay a nonmember. Thus a member merchant will employ only member agents.
In short, due to the premium differential resulting from the implicit merchant from Palermo (Sicily) complained that even (!) the Rums were not ready to buy the inferior black ginger that had, therefore, to be sent to another European country in the hope that it would be sold there. contract within the coalition, coalitions tend to be "closed." In an economy in which coalitions are utilized, a segregation will emerge, and its extent is determined by the information-transmission mechanism that underlines the economy. This theoretical examination of the coalition's boundaries can be utilized to address the above puzzles. Since the Maghribi traders organized agency relations within a coalition, member merchants hired only member agents and "trust" is observed only within the coalition. This also explains why the Maghribi traders established colonies in trade centers around the Mediterranean and did not established agency relations with Italian Jewish merchants. The premium required to keep a nonmember agent honest was higher than the one required to keep a member agent honest. Furthermore, once a coalition member emigrated he was certain to be employed as an agent by the other coalition members. Since the Maghribi traders adopted the culture of the Muslim world, emigration within this world was culturally and materially easy. The emigration to Italy, however, with its different cultural heritage, was much more difficult. Employing nonmember Italian Jews as agents was prohibitively expensive.
The immigration process of the Maghribi traders from around Baghdad to Tunisia established patterns of information transmission. The social ties among these immigrants provided them with a mechanism for information transmission which, in turn, determined the extent of agency relations. At the same time the fact that agents were hired only from within the Maghribi group gave their separate social identity a function and preserved this identity. It provided the social associations and interactions among individuals which are necessary for the continuation of a social structure. In short, the Maghribi traders' separate identity within the Jewish communities was preserved because it provided a network for the transmission of information that facilitated agency relations, while the agency relations themselves provided the social interactions required for retaining their separate identity. When the Maghribi traders ceased to operate in long-distance trade and to utilize agency relations, the social interactions diminished, and the social structure-the Maghribi traders group-lost its vitality. It was a social structure-the Maghribi traders group-that provided the information required for the operation of an economic institution-the coalition. On the other hand, the closeness of this economic institution preserved the social structure.
Information Flows within the Coalition
Coalition members enjoyed internal information flows that facilitated the reputation mechanism. These information flows provided the information required to uncover cheating, and contributed to the "capital premium" available to honest coalition members. Information was 9 According to the theory advanced here, an agent will never cheat. Thus, if monitoring agents is costly, the merchant's claim that he will monitor is not credible. Knowing that the merchants will not monitor, agents will cheat. Anticipating this, a merchant will not employ agents to begin with. Greif coalition enabled the traders to reduce the transaction cost associated with agency relationships by reducing the wage premium that had to be paid to keep an agent honest, the cost associated with inability to operate through agents in relations known beforehand to be of short duration, and the cost of acquiring information on prospective agents.
The common religious-ethnic origin of the traders provided the natural boundaries for the coalition and served as a signal where information regarding past conduct could be obtained, while the commercial and social ties within the coalition served as a network for the transmission of information. The information-transmission mechanism generated by the social structure-the Maghribi traders group-supported the operation of an economic institution-the coalition. On the other hand, this economic institution, which promoted organizing agency relations only among members of this social structure, motivated the Maghribi traders to interact and thus to preserve their social structure, their distinct identity within the Jewish world.
We see, then, that the family firm was not the only medieval form of mercantile enterprise. Coalitions existed as well and may have been superior to family firms in that they provided flexibility in agency relations unachievable within family firms. Interestingly, empirical evidence on exchange relations in contemporary Wisconsin and South East Asia suggests that reputation and implicit contracts among members of "coalitions" still play an important role in helping businessmen overcome contractual problems. 93 The extent to which coalitions and other nonmarket institutions contributed to the development of long-distance trade, the forms of these institutions, and their evolution and interrelationships with institutions related to production are yet to be explored. Analysis of the nonmarket economic institutions employed in different historical episodes will lead the way to a comparative institutional investigation that may shed light on the evolutionary process of economic institutions.
